

PAO 84-0146

STAT

26 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Request by United States Global Strategy Council to Review
Proposal for the Creation of a National Strategy Council

1. Paul D. Humphries, Executive Director, United States Global Strategy Council, asks that you comment on a proposal by General Albert C. Wedemeyer to create a National Strategy Council. General Wedemeyer is also a member of the Global Strategy Council. (See attached biography.)

2. General Wedemeyer believes a new official agency is needed to supplement existing government agencies and departments dealing with international affairs. Members of this Council would be appointed by the President and act as an objective, non-partisan advisory group.

3. The Global Strategy Council was formed in February 1983 and has called for a "recasting" of U.S. foreign policy to provide a clearer sense of the international goals of U.S. The Council has about 60 members who are business, academic, legislative, former military and intelligence officials.

4. Recommendation: I believe it would be inappropriate for you to comment on the merits of this proposal. The implication is that the National Security Council is inadequate. You may wish to authorize me to respond on your behalf, directing Mr. Humphries to seek comments more appropriately from The White House or Congress.

STAT

George V. Lauder

Attachments

L-306

SUBJECT: Request by United States Global Strategy Council to Review
Proposal for the Creation of a National Strategy Council

AGREE:

/s/ John N. McMahon
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

31 MAR 1984

Date

DISAGREE: Will Provide Comments:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

PAO/KJH/mbm 26 Mar 84

STAT

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee (w/att.)

STAT

PAO 84-0126

STAT

26 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence


FROM: George V. Lauder
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George V. Lauder

STAT

Attachments

DCI
EXEC
REG

2306

SUBJECT: Request by United States Global Strategy Council to Review
Proposal for the Creation of a National Strategy Council

AGREE:

/s/ William J. Casey

30 MAR 1984

Director of Central Intelligence


Date

DISAGREE: Will Provide Comments:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

PAO/KJH/mbm/26 Mar 84
Distribution:



STAT

STAT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL				
16	C/PAO	X			
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		23 March Date			

Remarks

Recommendations please to DCI and DDCI.

Executive Secretary

16 March 1984

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT



United States
Global Strategy Council

Executive Registry

84-1256

Att. ER84-1256/1

March 12, 1984

The Hon. William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

As part of our Council's ongoing effort to improve the quality of U.S. strategy, I have enclosed a copy of a proposal recently offered by one of our members, Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. This proposal has been conveyed to President Reagan and is under review by his staff.

While bringing this proposal to your attention is the major concern here, it would aid our efforts at the Council if you could possibly provide us your comments on Gen. Wedemeyer's ideas. Does the creation of a National Strategy Council have merit? Should alternative solutions be examined? What are your thoughts on the subject in general? Any comments or suggestions offered would help us evaluate this proposal and how best to approach a solution. Your comments would not only provide a basis for our further research and analysis on ways to improve the national security and strategy process, but we also have in mind consolidating all comments received and forwarding this summary without attribution to the appropriate action officials.

I would very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss these matters with you personally and will call your secretary in about two weeks to arrange an appointment.

Very truly yours,

Paul D. Humphries
Executive Director

PDH/blh
Enclosure

L-306



Executive Registry

84-1256/1

United States Global Strategy Council

March 12, 1984

The Hon. John McMahon
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

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Very truly yours,

Paul D. Humphries
Executive Director

PDH/blh
Enclosure

6861 Elm Street • McLean, Virginia 22101
(703) 821-0700

MEMORANDUM ON A NATIONAL STRATEGY COUNCIL

For forty years and more, I have been concerned about the adequacy of our national policymaking machinery to deal with the challenges of an increasingly turbulent and complex world.

My first clear awakening in this regard occurred back in 1941 in the months before Pearl Harbor. I was staff officer in the War Department charged with drafting a broad plan (later known as "the Victory Program") for the mobilization and employment of U.S. resources in a possible global war with the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. The American public was sharply divided in its attitudes toward the conflicts raging in Europe and elsewhere. A babble of voices urging various degrees of involvement or non-involvement arose on all sides. Torrents of foreign and domestic propaganda sought to sway opinion. The nation's fate and future unquestionably were at stake in a world drifting ever closer toward general war.

It is perhaps not surprising that in this situation official Washington seemed as confused and divided as the nation itself. However, it was the task of the small group of strategic planners, of which I was a member, to chart and propose a specific course. Before long I rediscovered the obvious: a journey can be charted only with a destination in mind, and STRATEGY can be plotted only with goals or aims in mind. I accordingly set out to discover what the objectives of U.S. involvement might be — other than the physical destruction of the forces which might then be arrayed against us. What were our country's true interests? How could those interests best be protected and advanced? What kind of world did we wish to emerge from the cataclysm of another terrible war?

To my consternation, I could find few if any concrete answers to these vital questions. So far as I could discover, no systematic official attention had been given them. No mechanisms for considering them in an orderly and informed way existed within the government. Indeed, I found little awareness or acceptance of the notion that supreme issues of war and peace required thorough analysis in the top echelons of the national government. An uneasy feeling came over me that the ship of state was rudderless in the storm; or, if the rudder were still intact, there at least were no charts and orders on the bridge to guide the navigator.

And so, when war came, we embarked on a great crusade to slay the dragons which then confronted us. Plunging emotionally into the conflict, we endured much bloodshed and suffering (and imposed even more on others), expended untold treasure, and helped wreak destruction on large portions of the earth's surface. When the smoke of battle lifted, we spent billions more to restore the damage that had been done. Then, to our sorrow, even the idealistic slogans (e.g., "the Four Freedoms") that had inspired and sustained the crusade were mocked by the rise of new tyrannies, new wars, and a flood of new problems that dwarfed the old ones. Instead of ridding the world of tyranny, we found that, in destroying one set of tyrants, we had simply paved the way for the rise of other more dangerous ones.

After World War II, a few promising steps were taken in Washington to improve the mechanisms of inter-agency coordination. I am thinking here of the establishment of such agencies as the National Security Council and the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. But it is my considered opinion that those steps have long since proven inadequate. In general we have continued to follow the previous patterns of expediency. New policies unfold from year to year and from administration to administration in response to external events or to the shifting requirements of domestic opinion and partisan opportunism. In foreign affairs we have observed since 1945 alternating patterns of *real-politik* and fuzzy idealism, containment and detente, irresolute engagement and confused withdrawal. At home we have seen an endless patchwork of economic policies, fiscal policies, military policies, social policies — and these too frequently have developed haphazardly, in response to particular pressures, with little concern for the harmony of the whole, the conservation of resources, the advancement of our national aims and objectives, or the good of the country.

Let me briefly illustrate the effects of this fateful state of affairs on foreign policy. In the years immediately following World War II, U.S. leaders awakened to the realization that the Soviet Union, far from being the cooperative post-war partner they had led themselves to expect, was in fact embarked on a relentless course of territorial and ideological self-aggrandizement. In response, they embraced the much-touted policy of "containment." Whereas this policy appeared at first to reflect a needed sharpening of Uncle Sam's eyesight, and a stiffening of his spine, it soon degenerated (in the absence of strategic vision) into an excuse for unilateral intervention everywhere. It meant the almost automatic commitment of American resources wherever a "threat" appeared — in Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam. . . It meant the frequent shedding of American blood. It meant not only the early abandonment of our faith in collective security, but even of our insistence that others play a primary role in defending

themselves. It thus meant the gradual shifting of many of the security burdens of the non-communist world onto the shoulders of the United States. It meant the constant dissipation of American resources. The debacle of Vietnam provided an indescribably tragic climax to this process. The Kremlin, it will be noted, has quite consistently conserved its resources and retained its freedom of maneuver. The Soviet strategists are playing a patient game in which "the objective balance of forces" is shifting gradually in their favor. The scolding once administered to the ancient Athenians by one of their public men can thus be directed most appropriately at present-day Americans: "Shame on you Athenians." Demosthenes exclaimed,

for not wishing to understand that in war one must not allow oneself to be at the command of events, but to forestall them. You Athenians are the strongest of all the Greeks, in ships, cavalry, infantry and revenue, and you do not make the best of them.

You make war against Philip like a barbarian when he wrestles — if he suffers a blow, he immediately puts his hand to it. If he is struck again he puts his hand there too, but he has not the skill or does not think of parrying the blow aimed at him or of evading his antagonist. You, likewise, if you hear that Philip has attacked the Chaeronea, you send help there; if he is at Thermopylae, you run there, and if he turns aside you follow him, to right or left, as if you were acting on his orders. Never a fixed plan, never any precautions — you wait for bad news before you act.

I am not so naive as to believe that all the ordeals America has experienced over the past 35 years could have been avoided or even alleviated. I have some appreciation of the complexity and intractability of historical forces. I have some appreciation of the difficulties of governing a free society, and I concede the necessity — indeed the high wisdom — of basing all public policy in America on the solid foundation of popular consent. I do believe, however, that with more effective means for guiding the development of coordinated national policies, and with more coherent strategies in pursuing those policies, the record could have been much brighter.

My present concern arises not only from the conviction that our governmental machinery and methods are little improved over those of the past, but also from the knowledge that today's world is a far more dangerous one than that of yesteryear. We could get by in World War II with what we had and with what we did. Our security and prosperity in the future. I am positive, will require more.

It is a commonplace to note that the relatively secure, isolated inward-looking world of the Founding Fathers is long gone. Modern communications and transportation have shrunk the world to the dimensions of an eighteenth century township. Events in the remotest corners of the globe now can, and often do, affect conditions everywhere. Improved nutrition and medicine have swollen the earth's populations, introducing an era of intensified struggle for space, power, and resources. Intense ideological conflicts divide nations and peoples. Traditional values and authority are everywhere besieged. The rise of ultradestructive weapons (biological and chemical as well as nuclear) has jeopardized life. Access to these weapons by small, irresponsible states — or even terrorist groups — has introduced an incalculably destabilizing and dangerous element into human affairs.

To compete in this struggle and to meet successfully these challenging conditions, our government must introduce elements of foresight and forehandedness into the management of affairs that have not heretofore been compelling. As in 1941, the American people are sharply divided today on issues of defense and foreign policy. They are probably more divided than in 1941 on so-called 'social' issues. The babble of voices arising from the media, institutions of learning, think tanks, countless private organizations, action groups, lobbies, etc., far surpasses in volume and variety the clamor during the months preceding World War II. This uninhibited expression — although seldom fully informed, often misinformed, and sometimes mischievous — is a sign of social and intellectual vitality; it must continue as the primary engine of our democratic system.

However, the clash of private views and interests (as expressed in the political process) is in itself no longer an adequate method for development of sound and foresighted national policies in this age of perpetual crisis. The efforts of the existing branches and departments of the government to develop and guide policy simply **must** be supplemented. In my opinion, we sorely need AN OFFICIAL AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT to serve as a steadying gyroscope to the ship of state. We need what I would call a **National Strategy Council** — which I will hereafter briefly describe.

May I emphasize that I am NOT using the term **strategy** in its usual military connotation. In fact, I would subordinate the military connotation of strategy in a much broader and comprehensive interpretation, emphasizing the political, economic, cultural, and psycho-social forces as instruments of national policy. Strategy, I would define, as THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DEVELOPING AND EMPLOYING ALL THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND PSYCHO-SOCIAL RESOURCES OF A NATION TOGETHER WITH ITS ARMED FORCES IN THE ONGOING STRUGGLE TO INSURE THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE.

This comprehensive interpretation of strategy would give U.S. policy a measure of coherence and stability it has not had, and does not now possess, but which is utterly mandatory if our Republic is to meet the challenges of the future. It would encourage the integration of matters (for example, economic and military programs) which too often have been treated in isolation, and thus unrealistically or unwisely. It is my conviction that if ALL the instruments of national policy are employed imaginatively, and in a timely and coordinated manner, the frequency of occasions requiring a resort to military force would dramatically decline. We would not find ourselves — as we so often have done in the past — 'backing into' wars, or being obliged to employ naked military force because opportunities to pursue peaceful options were either unperceived or neglected.

To return to the National Strategy Council: Although the idea of yet another agency of government may be viewed by some with skepticism, I unequivocally urge its favorable consideration, and soon. May I summarize my concept of the nature and functions of a National Strategy Council. I visualize a relatively small continuing Council of perhaps eleven distinguished citizens who would devote their full time and talents to studying and formulating recommendations concerning national strategy in its broadest aspects. This body would possess ADVISORY functions only. It would regularly provide advice for the enlightenment and guidance of the legislative and executive branches of the government — and indeed, when appropriate, for the American people. The Council would have semi-autonomous status comparable to that of the Federal Reserve Board. The members would have access to all sources of official and unofficial information and strategic intelligence, and possess the experience, expertise, and time required to evaluate basic policy in the foreign and domestic fields. The Council would be in a position to judge the significance of international developments, especially the implications of such developments for U.S. interests, and to weigh the mutual effect of domestic policy proposals on each other and on foreign policy.


Members of the Council, like Supreme Court Justices, would be appointed for life by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. To the degree that such qualities could be identified, men and women of wisdom and vision would be sought. They would be chosen as individuals of unquestionable patriotism and mature judgements. They would be drawn from the practical as well as academic fields of politics, economics, history, law, business, and the military. A small secretariat would be provided to support the Council. Further, a small professional staff would be provided for each member, as in the Supreme Court. Members would be free from the heavy administrative duties that burden department heads. I would hope that, in time, the Council would so establish itself in the public mind as an objective, non-partisan agency of such extraordinary competence that it would be accorded the prestige and authority (although not the formal power) now enjoyed by the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, I believe that this Council would be in a position to contribute more to the future prosperity and well-being of this nation than any other single agency, arm, or organ of the government.

One further suggestion: To highlight the shift of strategic emphasis from military to the broader, comprehensive policy concerns. I propose that the National Strategy Council be established physically in the buildings presently occupied by the National War college at Fort McNair. I would call this location the "National Strategy Center." The Word "war" would be eliminated from the name of the institution and the place. Although war in its narrower military aspects would continue to be studied by the armed services, the focus of the National Strategy Center would be on coordinated employment of all the instruments of national policy. Varying circumstances would suggest the application of one or another combination of such instruments in particular circumstances. At times, one combination would be indicated: at other times, another. Force and the use or threat of force would always play a role in national strategy. But force should be employed only in coordination with other instruments and only when those instruments, by themselves, are unable to achieve national aims and objectives.

In summary, let me again emphasize the following crucial points:

- 1) The contemporary world presents our nation with challenges that are truly unprecedented.
- 2) Our traditional patterns of national policymaking have become increasingly inadequate; they are dangerously inadequate today.
- 3) The crying need of the future is for strategic vision, and for the instruments through which sound national strategy can be developed and directed.

Never in my career as soldier or civilian have I written in greater concern for the future of our country, or with greater conviction of the need for reforms of the sort I have herein tried to describe.


A.C. WEDEMEYER
General, U.S. Army (Ret.)